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Abstract: In this article, I motivate for the view that the best account of the
foundations of morality in the African tradition should be grounded on some
relevant spiritual property – a view that I call ‘ethical supernaturalism’. In
contrast to this position, the literature has been dominated by humanism as
the best interpretation of African ethics, which typically is accompanied by a
direct rejection of ‘ethical supernaturalism’ and a veiled rejection of non-nat-
uralism (Gyekye 1995: 129–43; Metz 2007: 328; Wiredu 1992: 194–6). Here
primarily, by appeal to methods of analytic philosophy, which privileges analy-
sis and (moral) argumentation, I set out to challenge and repudiate humanism
as the best interpretation of African ethics; I leave it for a future project to
develop a fully fledged African spiritual meta-ethical theory. 
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Introduction
The debate about whether African ethics is best interpreted as religious or sec-
ular is dominated by the latter position. A secular interpretation of foundations
of African morality is typically described in terms of ‘humanism’1 – the liter-
ature visibly favours humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics,2
and this position is accompanied by a direct rejection of ‘ethical supernatural-
ism’3 – the view that morality is grounded on some spiritual property and a
veiled rejection of non-naturalism.4 In this article, primarily, I reject the claim
that a secular humanism best interprets African ethics. Furthermore, I will
content myself, in this instance, to merely motivate, note, not argue for, ethical
supernaturalism – I leave it for a future project to develop a fully fledged
African spiritual meta-ethical theory.5
I reject humanism as a basis for African ethics because it fails to capture
some of the prevalent thoughts and intuitions we Africans typically have about
our duties towards the natural environment – the idea that, in some sense, we
are one substance with nature (Murove 2007) and that some aspects of nature
matter for their own sakes to some degree. I observe that a truly African ethics
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must cohere with a holistic and supernaturalist tenor that often characterises
African ontology, which in turn demands that we accord moral status to some
aspects of the environment, like animals, for their own sakes.6 I show that
humanistic moral theories in the sub-Saharan tradition have much more diffi-
culty ascribing fundamental moral consideration to nature for its own sake.
This failure on the part of humanism, as defended by many scholars of African
(moral) thought, warrants its rejection as it departs from the web of intercon-
nectedness and interdependence that characterises African thought. This fail-
ure is interesting given that it appears that these scholars are also committed
to granting some moral standing to some aspects of nature (Metz 2012: 387–
402), but their human-centred ethical accounts renders them unable to do so.
I first inform the reader about the method of enquiry I will use in this arti-
cle. This is a philosophical enquiry, in that it seeks to go beyond merely
rehearsing anthropological and historical claims about what Africans actually
believed, important as these might be. I seek an account that is both African,
namely one which draws from indigenous intellectual resources and one that
is also philosophically plausible. I appeal to the techniques of analytic philos-
ophy, which are characterised both by conceptual analysis and by evaluation
of (moral) arguments. All things being equal, I favour an account that is both
African and philosophically plausible. Whilst I grant that humanism may
reflect certain features of African cultures, as a matter of anthropological fact,
I argue the position is nevertheless philosophically untenable.7
To demonstrate the implausibility of humanism within the African moral
tradition, I structure this article as follows. In the first section, I define human-
ism and show how it typically reveals itself in the literature on African ethics
by considering the theories of Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu and Thad Metz,
respectively. In the second section, I show how humanistic accounts fail to
accommodate a dominant conception of African metaphysics, which I under-
stand to be tri-logical, insofar as spiritual, social and environmental aspects
are held to constitute one reality. In the final section, I motivate, though I do
not argue, for ethical supernaturalism as a viable and probably plausible alter-
native to a humanist account of African ethics, insofar as it best accommodates
our duties to some aspects of the environment. 
Defining (Secular) Humanism  
In teasing out humanism, I consider the works of three influential African
scholars: Wiredu,8 Gyekye9 and Metz.10 I consider these three scholars based
on their influence and the quality of their work in the African tradition. Gyekye
defines ‘humanism’ as the ‘the doctrine that sees human needs, interests and
dignity as fundamental, thus constitutes the foundation for Akan morality’
(1995: 143). Thus, according to Gyekye, one cannot meaningfully and suffi-
ciently talk about morality unless one has made essential reference to some
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human properties, specifically human needs, interests and dignity. We need
not now resolve the question of which, among these three properties men-
tioned by Gyekye, is the foundational property. It suffices to observe that some
human property is a foundation for morality. 
Like Gyekye, Wiredu defines ‘humanism’ as the claim that ‘it is a human
being that has value’ (Wiredu 1992: 194); or, as he puts it in another place,
‘the first axiom of all Akan axiological thinking is that man or woman is the
measure of all value’ (Wiredu 1996: 65). According to Wiredu, the source and
sit of all value, including moral value, is found in a human person. Metz, on
his part, describes his view as ‘ethical naturalism’ (2007: 328), but never quite
identifies his view as based on facts about human beings, although he implies
humanism – as I will show below. 
So, we aptly observe that humanism is a meta-ethical a claim – a view
about the nature of moral properties – that the source of all moral value is
essentially inherent in some human property or fact, hence natural/physical
and secular. I note and emphasise that these authors deliberately sever God
or any spiritual entity as responsible for the relevant moral property that
inheres in human beings. In other words, in the absence of human beings
there is no legitimate ground to talk about morality even if God were to be
present in the world. All other aspects of reality, the supernatural and the nat-
ural (environment) are morally neutral; morality is only possible when there
are human beings.
I do not wish to give the reader a false impression that it is not possible to
talk of a non-secular humanism in the African tradition, and other traditions.
But, here, I am addressing myself to a dominant (view in the literature) but
problematic secular humanism that interprets morality purely in terms of
some human property. Thinkers like Benezet Bujo (2005), Laurentia Magesa
(1997), Augustine Shutte (2001) (and others) appear to be articulating a spir-
itual humanism. But, it is not a task of this article to consider this spiritual
moral vision. 
Three Humanistic Theories in the African Tradition
Gyekye’s Humanistic Ethics
I think it is best to interpret Gyekye’s moral theory as flowing from his onto-
logical conception of human nature, which is dualistic: individuality (auton-
omy) and community (common good). This interpretation is best borne out in
his defence of what he calls ‘moderate communitarianism’, a view he pro-
pounds as a response to what he considers to be ‘extreme communitarianism’
(1995: 39). The latter view, according to Gyekye, has been advocated by
African leaders after independence and finds philosophical expression in the
works of a Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti (2004: 324–811). Gyekye
identifies one major problem with ‘extreme communitarianism’: this view
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defines a person as entirely constituted by social relations and as a result tends
to overlook the individual aspects of a person, which in turn implies that this
theory has no place for (individual) human rights (1995: 39). 
On his part, Gyekye favours a conception of communitarianism which at
heart balances the individual and communal aspects of a human person, a
view he believes to be consistent with basic human (individual) rights. In this
regard he states:
The restricted communitarianism offers a more appropriate and adequate account
of the self … in that it addresses the dual features of the self: as a communal being
and as … autonomous  … (Gyekye 1992: 113).  
In his later statement of moderate communitarianism, he avers: 
The view seems to represent a clear attempt to come to terms with the natural
sociality as well as the individuality of the human person. It requires the recognition
of communality and individuality … I think the most satisfactory way to recognize
the claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of
equal moral standing (Gyekye 1995: 41, emphasis mine).
It is interesting to note that Gyekye believes that these supposed ontological
properties that constitute a self are also a basis for determining moral value.12
In other words, humanity itself, or some understanding of what it means to be
human, is a function of morality: the human feature of autonomy grounds dig-
nity, as a fundamental moral fact, and that of community grounds welfare as a
basic moral fact.13 If my interpretation of Gyekye is true, then his is truly a
humanistic ethics.   
Wiredu’s Humanistic Ethics
To elucidate on his moral theory, Wiredu appeals to an Akan maxim – ‘it is a
human being who has value’ (1992: 194) – which when correctly construed
amounts to two moral claims: 
Through the first meaning the message is imparted that all value derives from
human interests and through the second that human fellowship is the most impor-
tant of human needs (ibid.). 
From this quotation it is clear that value – in fact, as an ardent reader would
have observed, Wiredu states that all value, and I may add, moral value –
derives from human interests. Thus, moral value on Wiredu’s ethics is derived
on some facts, interests or welfare, about human beings – I observe that
Wiredu in his writings uses the words ‘interests’ and ‘welfare’ interchangeably
(Wiredu 1992: 194; 1996: 65; 2004: 18). The source or foundation of morality
is some human property: welfare. 
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Metz’s Humanistic Ethics
In terms of moral foundations, Metz favours a secular ethics, which he
describes as ‘ethical naturalism’. On face value, it is not clear what natural
item in the furniture of the world will serve as a basis for his naturalistic
ethical theory. His proclivity towards humanism is indicated by his endorse-
ment of humanistic interpretations by Gyekye and Wiredu (Metz 2007: 328,
special attention to footnote 25). Metz’s clearest statement of humanism is
found in his theory of moral status (2011: 387–402). In this particular article,
he defends a ‘modal–relationist’ interpretation of moral status. On this
account, some entity has moral status insofar as it has the ability to commune
with human beings in a particular way. The relevant relational property that
qualifies some entity for a full moral status is essentially a human feature.
Human beings thus serve a basis for determining the moral standing of other
entities. Metz defends this conception of moral status thus: 
Below I contend that the most promising kind of relationalism is one according to
which something has moral status insofar as it has a certain relation to human
beings in particular … (2011: 390). 
I advise the reader to note that, according to Metz, the moral standing of non-
human entities, say animals, is not a function of their possessing the relevant
interactive moral property but a function of how they can commune with
human beings who alone have this relevant moral property. We may ask here:
why must a possession of moral status (on the part of animals for example)
depend on relations with human beings? In the same article, Metz observes: 
The theory might appear to be anthropocentric in that it cashes out moral status in
terms of certain human capacities. To be able to be an object of a communal rela-
tionship, on this view, is analysed in terms of a capacity to relate to normal human
beings in a certain way. And so there is an irreducible appeal to humanity in its
conception of moral status (2011: 390, emphasis mine). 
So, Metz explains moral status by appeal to some fact about a human being,
that is the capacity for friendliness. Other entities have moral status insofar as
they can be included in communal relations with human beings, but, other
than that, they have no independent moral standing. On this account of moral
status, if there were no human beings then there could be no talk of moral sta-
tus at all since such a talk depends on some moral property which is essentially
human. On this view, even if Martians may have the relevant capacity for
friendliness towards other beings, like animals, they nevertheless cannot be
objects or subjects of friendship with human beings, for whatever odd biolog-
ical reason they have no moral status. To have moral status, Metz is unequivo-
cal, there is an irreducible appeal to humanity. I leave it for another project to
show the implausibility of this conception of moral status insofar as it is not
African and insofar as it fails to provide a satisfactory argument. It is suffi-
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cient, however, for the purposes of this article to note the humanistic moral
grounds entailed by Metz’s conception of moral status.
I now proceed to reject humanism as a meta-ethical theory in the African
moral tradition. 
Rejection of Humanism
I reject the claim that rightness and wrongness (or, morality) are definable
only in terms of some human property(s), be it their interests, welfare or
friendliness. My argument is predicated on certain fundamental intuitions that
generally characterise African thought – that all reality is interconnected and
interdependent. This argument will be successful only if one holds the view
that some aspects of nature matter for their own sake, that is on facts indepen-
dent of human beings.14 I advance an argument that seeks to restore and protect
the moral standing of some aspects of nature, since such an approach best
coheres with an African metaphysics, which is typically represented as holistic
and spiritual. By ‘holism’ I am referring to the claim that social (human), nat-
ural (environment) and spiritual (God, ancestors and spirits) communities are
interdependent and interrelated (Bujo 2005: 424). This view is best captured
thus: ‘Everything – God, ancestors, humans, animals, plants and inanimate
objects – is connected, interdependent and interrelated’ (Verhoef and Michel
1997: 395). According to this dominant conception of African metaphysics,
there is no place for separating these three categories of reality. The human is
not seen as separate and above, but is considered to be an intrinsic part of this
interconnected whole (Tangwa 2004: 389). 
My major argument is that these humanistic accounts give an interpretation
of African ethics that stands outside of this holistic metaphysical understand-
ing. Metz, for his part, completely severs his moral theory from any supernat-
ural considerations, though he believes his principle of right action can inform
one about how to relate to these spiritual beings (2007: 328). Gyekye and
Wiredu, interestingly, though they advocate a naturalist ethics, withdraw from
this African metaphysics when it suits them15 (for example, see in Deng 2004:
501). Thus, my challenge is to maintain consistency, in that, if Gyekye and
Wiredu seek to articulate naturalist (humanist) moral theories, these theories
must be consistent with the metaphysics that grounds it. I further challenge
Metz seriously to reconsider the African status of the metaphysics that informs
his ethical theory, whether it is African or non-African, if it is his quest to
articulate a view that has an African pedigree (Metz 2007: 324). To facilitate
my argument for rejecting humanism, I employ the following case. 
Animal Torture and Humanism
I ask you to consider these two cases of animal torture. I imagine a Thabo
who enjoys microwaving cats just for the fun of it. Or, I imagine Thabo taking
64 Motsamai Molefe
pleasure in throwing chimpanzees or some animal from a tall building. These
two cases in my opinion are clear instances of animal torture. It is my
strongly held intuition, and of many others, that this act is not only morally
wrong but also wrongs the animals in question. But, for this intuition to be
acceptable, one must be committed to the claim that animals morally matter
for their own sakes, that is they have some moral status – I will define this
phrase below.  
The heart of my argument is that secular humanism, as represented by these
three influential theories, fail to give a plausible account of why Thabo’s act
of torturing these animals is wrong. If they do give a plausible account, they
nonetheless give an unsatisfactory rationale. With regards to this case, I work
on the assumption that a plausible moral account in African ethics ought to
grant animals some moral status. This is why we who hold an African under-
standing of metaphysics find the above cases to be morally abhorrent. My
position in this regard is grounded on my commitment to a certain under-
standing of African metaphysics. 
‘Moral status’ is the idea that some aspects of nature, for example, in this
case, cats or chimpanzees, are owed some (direct) moral duty on the basis of
some moral consideration (Behrens 2011: 87). This talk of moral status serves
as a normative parameter that defines what is permissible or impermissible
with regards to our treatment of some aspects of nature (Toscano 2011: 14).
Metz holds that talk of moral status is two-pronged: on the one hand, it is a
claim about the wrongness of the act, that is breaking some moral code; and,
on the other, it is about wronging the entity in question, that is making it worse
off (Metz 2011: 389). 
Thus, a theory of moral status must specify the relevant moral feature(s) in
virtue of which some aspects of nature have moral status and others do not.
Some accounts of moral status are individualist (they locate the relevant moral
property on some internal feature of the entity in question, like memory, con-
sciousness, rationality etc.); some are holist (they locate the relevant moral
property on the group itself, like the ecosystem) and some accounts explain
moral status by appeal to some relational property, like care, friendliness or
love (Behrens 2011: 70).
The key issue for me with regards to humanism of whatever interpretation
is: can it account for the moral status of animals, for example, without appeal
to some facts or consequences for human beings? Thus, I am asking, or rather
arguing that secular humanism fails to secure the idea that the act of torturing
animals is wrong and wrongs the animal in question by appeal to some facts
about the animal itself. Humanism, I hope to show, by its very nature does not
have the corpus to grant animals an intrinsic moral status, that is animals can-
not be good in and of themselves, insofar as humanism only grants animals
moral standing that is predicated on some instrumental relationship with
human beings or by derivation from some human fact. This kind of ethics, I
argue, fails plausibly to capture the idea that animals matter for their own
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sakes in African ethics. Environmental ethics emerged as a rejection to such
human-centred theories of value (Murove 2004: 196).  
If all moral value is somehow essentially derived from human beings, it is
not clear how and why we can say that Thabo is doing something wrong and
is wronging the poor chimpanzees. It appears that common sense morality
presses upon us to say something wrong is going on here. One famous line of
defence for the animal is Immanuel Kant’s claim to the effect that animals, for
example, are valuable only indirectly (1996: 296). At the heart of this defence
is the claim that torturing animals, on the part of a human being, will harden
the heart and predispose one to be so cruel to human beings. One is enjoined
not to harm animals as that would hurt her humanity. Thus, ‘We disrespect our
humanity when we act in inhumane ways towards non-persons, whatever their
species’ (Lori 2014). 
This line of reason is interesting, but I doubt it will do the job. It fails to
explain the wrong in question by appeal to some facts about the victim, the
animal. The key question is: is the animal being wronged when it is tortured
for fun? My intuition is that, yes it is being wronged. The indirect defence
does not at all concern itself with the animal; it focuses entirely on the human
person. Furthermore, we can suppose, for argument’s sake, that Thabo will
not develop a cruel disposition towards other human beings, his humanity
will be intact. Does this mean the act of torturing animals is justified? The
indirect defence, I observe, does not quite do the job of securing the moral
status of animals. 
I proceed to consider whether these three scholars can offer an account that
shows the wrong in question with regards to animal torture, such that the ani-
mals matters for its own sake. 
The challenge for Wiredu and Gyekye is almost similar, and so I consider
them together initially – though I think the best reading of Wiredu is that he
advocates what I dub ‘humanistic-welfare’ and Gyekye ‘humanistic-dignity’.
One possible response by Wiredu and Gyekye would be to include in their
account, of that which has moral status, all aspects of nature that have a capac-
ity for welfare. If they adopt this line of reason, then, what makes some entity
morally valuable is its capacity for welfare; and, thus, dogs, human beings,
cats morally matter because they all share a capacity for welfare. If they make
this move, however, it immediately damages the humanist basis of their views.
They must then also be willing to change their positions, to base moral values
not on human interests/needs but on the interests or the needs of any entity
which has the capacity for welfare. It appears that what does the work of
accounting for moral status is not some human property per se but the relevant
moral property, which can also be had by animals and also extra-terrestrial
beings like Martians. Grounding moral status on some capacity for welfare
itself is tantamount to rejection of humanism.
The virtue of basing moral status on some relevant moral property and not
human beings per se is that it allows animals to have moral status for their
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own sake. It is wrong to torture a cat for fun because one would be making it
worse off, that is wronging it or not respecting its capacity for welfare. But,
Wiredu and Gyekye cannot comfortably take this line of reasoning, more so
Wiredu, since it goes against the assertion that all moral value is derived from
human beings. 
The above argument, however, does more damage to Wiredu’s ‘humanis-
tic-welfare’ than it does to Gyekye’s ‘humanistic-dignity’. Wiredu’s human-
ism only traces welfare, whereas Gyekye’s traces two moral properties:
welfare and dignity; thus, Gyekye’s ethical account is dualist. The claim by
Gyekye would thus be: animals morally matter for their own sakes since they
are susceptible to welfare, they have partial moral status, but only human
beings have full moral status since they also have dignity. This interpretation
of Gyekye appears to save secular humanism. But, I argue that humanistic-
dignity is attended by a unique problem: one of lack of specificity (is dignity
best interpreted as based on a naturalist or supernaturalist property?) and of
identity (to what extent does his appeal to dignity qua autonomy still make his
account one that we can comfortably refer to as ‘African’ humanism). 
I start with the specificity problem. Gyekye is committed to the notion of
dignity as a central feature of a human person but he appears to be non-com-
mittal about the metaphysics that grounds this stance (Metz 2012: 63). In his
first statement of his commitment to dignity and human rights, he mentions
both the Christian conception of dignity qua the image of God and the natu-
ralist conception of dignity qua autonomy as defended by Kant (Gyekye 1992:
114). If he appeals to a supernaturalist account of dignity then he is involved
in a direct inconsistency (Gyekye 1992: 114) since he wants to defend a secu-
lar moral grounding; and, if he appeals to autonomy, a natural property, then
he is stuck with the fact that he has no African metaphysical basis for this con-
ception of dignity. I am not suggesting that it is wrong to borrow ideas from
other cultures. My contention, however, is that this borrowing, on the part of
Gyekye, results from a failure to articulate an ethics grounded on an African
metaphysics. It is this failure that provokes the need to borrow alien concepts.  
If Gyekye settles for autonomy as a basis for dignity, for the sake of consis-
tency of seeking a natural interpretation of morality, as his writings do, in his
elaboration of a self that is constituted by autonomy and communality, then
one is tempted to accuse this account of being not appropriately African
(1995: 54). Though his account, as characterised by dignity qua autonomy, is
humanistic, I observe that it fails to be an African humanism. I am not claim-
ing that for a view to be ‘African’ it must be devoid of foreign or alien ele-
ments – there is no such a thing as a pure culture. The essence of my argument
is based on Gyekye’s ‘criteria of what would count as genuine African philos-
ophy’ (1995: 7). I observe he fails his own test.  
Interestingly, Gyekye articulates a criterion of what is to count as a genuine
African theory. His criterion stipulates two conditions. Firstly, African philos-
ophy is to be generally derived from some ‘African cultural and historical
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experience’ (1995: 7). This implies that there must some historical or anthro-
pological basis for grounding a position as African; it must be traceable to
some facets of African culture (see also Metz 2007: 323–4). Secondly, foreign
or alien elements may also be considered as part of African philosophy; but,
this can be the case only if they meet certain conditions: they (foreign items)
must in the unfolding of time be so infused in the stream of African culture
that they will lose their alien status, that is future generations of African culture
must lose sight of their alien status; and, lastly they must be accepted by the
general population of the recipient culture rather than merely by its elite
(Gyekye 1995: 8). 
It is obvious to me that the notion of autonomy, which is a dominant West-
ern moral concept, which grounds an influential moral and political system in
its culture, is foreign to Africa (Kant 1996: 434–5). And, it is also empirically
true that this notion of autonomy has not met the conditions specified by
Gyekye himself before it can rightly qualify as ‘African’ so as to ground
African humanism.16 I hope with the unfolding of time, this notion of auton-
omy will take ground. But as things stand, it has not been infused in the main-
stream of African culture and it is largely used by the elite philosophers.  
Furthermore, my major concern is that Gyekye’s approach is not consis-
tent with the Akan metaphysics to which he typically appeals to ground much
of his philosophical work (Gyekye 1995: 85–6). Moreover, it is even more
disconcerting when local cultural resources have not been exhausted for one
to conveniently select an idea that at heart clashes with his ontological con-
ception of a self (Gyekye 1995: 85–102). Gyekye’s appeal to a foreign con-
cept would have been justified had he first demonstrated that the African
cultural or historical resources cannot proffer a plausible ground for human-
ism or his quest for dignity and human rights – this exercise, however, is
absent in his work. This is surprising given that Gyekye’s conception of per-
sonhood, or his interpretation of the Akan’s ontological conception of per-
sonhood, contains promising supernaturalistic categories that could be
adduced to ground such an account. But such a task is abandoned and Gyekye
hastily prefers ‘alien’ notions: the Christian idea of the image of God and/or
Kant’s idea of autonomy. 
Thus, Gyekye’s humanistic-dignity can explain what is wrong about tor-
turing an animal – that, one is undermining the welfare of the animal in ques-
tion. But, this account succeeds in being truly a humanistic theory, insofar as
it is dualist, as it also appeals to dignity, but it fails to be an African human-
istic theory as it flies opposite to a criteria advocated by Gyekye himself of
what is to count as ‘African’. We are thus stuck with a dualist account that is
humanistic, but not African in the relevant sense, as it appeals to a foreign
cultural item.  
Metz on his part has developed a conception of moral status, which, as I
have shown above is human-centred. I now criticise his human-centred theory
of value. On this account, animals have moral status because they can be
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objects of friendly relationships (they can be positively affected by a friendly
treatment by human beings and can be made worse off by unfriendly treat-
ment), but they are not subjects of such relations – it appears only human can
be both subjects and objects of such relations, as such have full moral status,
and animals have partial moral status since they can only be objects of friendly
relations. This theory of moral status, as it stands, appears to have the corpus
to tell us what is wrong with torturing animals for fun. Since animals can ben-
efit, as objects of human friendliness, then unfriendliness makes them worse
off, therefore it is wrong to torture animals for fun.  
I insist however that this theory is implausible as it offers a weak rationale
for protecting animals. Consider the case of a last human being on earth, who
will be dying in the next few seconds. Imagine a world (W2) with Martians
who are like us in every way except that they do not have a capacity for friend-
ship but, only, something like it, call it frendship. There are no animals on W2,
only Martians. It appears, upon some investigation, that Martians can have
communion with animals on earth since they can be objects of frendship, but,
for whatever reason – I stipulate – they cannot have a relationship with human
beings either as objects or subjects. 
On the basis of Metz’s theory, Martians with their capacity for frendship
do not have moral status since they cannot be included in community with
human beings either as objects and/or subjects. Say human beings go extinct
and Martians take over planet earth, on Metz’s account, we have no basis to
talk about moral status without an essential reference to human beings. The
extinction of human beings is tantamount to the disappearance of moral status.
Thus, in spite of the entities with a relevant (or close enough) capacity for
moral status, since there are no human beings, there is still no moral status. If
a Martian version of Thabo tortures an animal for fun, there would be no
ground of even talking about the wrong or even wronging of the animal in
question despite the fact that these animals can be made better or worse off by
Martian frendship or lack thereof. The absence of human beings in the equa-
tion is decisive in Metz’s conception of moral status – no human being, no
moral status since Metz insists on an irreducible appeal to humanity. The ani-
mal is only protected if there are human beings, not by its own right.    
The above objection, with regards to Metz’s conception of moral status, is
raised to motivate the case for a theory that locates moral status on some
intrinsic relevant feature that does not depend on any relation to human beings.
Metz’s approach to moral status, wherein ‘there is an irreducible appeal to
humanity in its conception of moral status’, makes his theory anthropocen-
tric17 in a problematic way for African ethics (Metz 2011: 400). This theory
makes human beings a necessary feature of the world, a view that has been
demonstrated to be false (Ramose 2009: 309–10). This view also commits us
to speciesism, a position Metz himself wants to avoid (Metz 2011: 400). 
Above, I considered whether the three accounts can account for what is
wrong with the act of torturing animals. Wiredu’s humanistic-welfare ulti-
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mately fails to secure animal’s moral standing, if it does, it must forgo its
humanism. Gyekye’s dualist humanist-dignity account does secure the ani-
mal’s standing at a cost of being unAfrican. And, Metz’s theory does account
for the wrongness of torturing animals for fun but not for their own sake, the
moral standing of animals depends on the moral standing of human beings. 
Failure as Grounds for the Rejection of Humanism
Why is humanism’s failure to capture some aspects of the environment essential
for its rejection? I argue that this failure is one that reflects the coherence test
on the part of humanism. In this sense, the secular version of humanism fails to
be ‘African’ in the relevant sense. I tease out this failure by appeal to a criterion
for successful African meta-ethics, as adumbrated by Elvis Imafidon thus: 
an all-inclusive metaphysical notion of being permeates the notion of the good in
the African traditions … Every valid norm would by all means promote and sustain
equilibrium and stability in the all-inclusive structure of being united by the com-
mon essence, force. Norms that do not meet this condition cannot be justified as
moral (Imafidon 2013: 48, 49). 
I take seriously the claim that ‘the good’ (all moral value) is a function of an
all-inclusive metaphysical notion of being. The failure of these three accounts
of humanism follows from their failure to present an understanding of ‘the
good’ in a way that coheres with this all-inclusive structure of being, that is a
holistic (spiritual) ontological system that characterises African thought.   
Before I further analyse and expand on the criteria set out by Imafidon, I
show the reader that this idea that morality flows from an all-inclusive struc-
ture of reality is a common one in the African tradition. Africans do not merely
advocate what we described above as ‘metaphysical holism’, they further talk
about ‘moral holism’ – the claim that things are interconnected, but these rela-
tions matter morally. For example, Felix Murove, an African philosopher from
Zimbabwe who studies the notions of ‘ukama’ and ‘ubuntu’, argues that
‘African ethics arises from an understanding of the world as an interconnected
whole whereby what it means to be ethical is inseparable from all spheres of
existence ... This relatedness blurs the distinction between humanity and
nature, the living and the dead, the divine and the human’ (Murove 2009: 29).
On the same note, Nel argues ‘that the most common feature of this cosmology
is the integration of three distinguishable aspects, namely environment, soci-
ety, and the spiritual. All activities are informed by this holistic understanding
… An act is never separated from its environmental, societal and spiritual
impact’ (Nel 2009: 37–8). In this thinking, morality ought not to be reduced
to one aspect of reality, it must encompass all aspects of reality – the environ-
ment, the social and spiritual – something that secular humanism fails to do
must serve as a basis for morality. 
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To build my case further, I need to clarify what Imafidon means by an ‘all
inclusive metaphysical notion of being’. I understand this phrase, as I indicated
above, to represent a typical understanding of an African ontological system
as holistic, both descriptively and normatively (see also Bujo 2005: 424;
Imafidon 2013: 40–2; Menkiti 2004: 328–9; Shutte 2001: 22; Teffo and Roux
2003: 196–7). If ‘the good’ truly is to be a function of this holistic under-
standing of reality, it is problematic, it appears to me, to reduce the good to
one aspect of this system – some human feature. A commitment to metaphys-
ical/moral holism resists the kind of reductionism that characterises human-
ism, wherein one reduces all moral to one aspect of the whole, human beings.
This reductive approach fails the criteria, as set out by Imafidon, that the good
is a function of the interaction of three aspects of reality. 
Moreover, this failure is best reflected by these accounts’ inability to plau-
sibly accommodate some aspects of nature in their moral system. This failure
is a result, I observe, of working with only one fragment of reality as the basis
for moral value.  
I further observe that secular humanism exaggerates on its conception of
a position occupied by human beings in the African ontology – human beings
are generally considered to hold a central role (Shutte 2001: 14). These
African scholars, I observe, take a leap from the view that human beings
play a central role, to an untenable position that human beings play a high
(foundational) role – the role of God. I use the words central and high
informed by a dominant African conception of an African ontological sys-
tem, which is sometimes represented spherically (Menkiti 2004: 327) and
often hierarchically (Bujo 2005: 424; Shutte 2001: 13). In the latter repre-
sentation, God is located at the apex (‘high’), followed by ancestors and spir-
its and at the centre is human beings and then followed by lower forms of
life like animals, plants and so on. It appears strange to me that a central
being can be the source of morality rather than a being that is most sublime
and transcendental, God. I am here not making an argument but merely
expressing an intellectual concern that this way of interpreting the African
system of reality does not strike the chord of my intuition at all, given the
dominant conception of African ontology.
I hold the view that the central role played by human beings does not imply
anthropocentrism. This view is best defended by these works (Behrens 2011:
2, 33, 49–56; LenkaBula 2008: 375–94). I also reject the view that interprets
the central role played by humans to mean that ‘in ethics, man proposes and
God reinforces’ (cited in Imafidon 2013: 51, see also Gyekye 2010). The idea
that man proposes ethics does not necessarily imply humanism, it could just
imply, ‘ethical subjectivism’18 or even ‘cultural relativism’,19 the idea that man
somehow invents morality, which is implied by the notion of proposing moral-
ity. A charitable reading, however, would imply humanism, where human inter-
ests objectively defined determine the right and God merely reinforces or
upholds morality (Gyekye 2010). 
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A more moderate view – one which coheres with an African ontology –
does not claim that man is the source of morality but, rather, man is the best
entry to morality among the empirical beings. Since the social category stands
at the centre of all reality, for the human being, she is the best interpreter of
morality. The human community gives us some clues and cues on our quest
for harmony among existing entities in the universe (Behrens 2011: 62). In
this sense, morality depends on God insofar as he gave human beings a sense
of morality or conscience (Gbadegesin 2005: 414–15) or, insofar as human
beings have been endowed with some capacity that qualifies them to have a
moral perspective that uniquely positions them to connect and respond to the
needs of other human beings, the environment and the spiritual realm20 (Cor-
nell 2009: 47–8). 
Motivation for Supernaturalism 
I reconstruct a robust spiritualist African ethics. I observe that the notion of
vitality offers a promising alternative to the humanist accounts I rejected
here, both as a meta-ethical and as a normative theory. As a meta-ethical
 theory, it defines rightness as a function of some (positive) relation to this
spiritual energy. On this view, the will of God is not expressed through His
commands as found in the divine commands but, rather, the will of God is
expressed by maintaining a balance among these ‘spirit-filled’ entities. This
meta-ethical view promises at least three normative theories, which attempt
to give some account of what counts as positive or negative relation to vital-
ity: a perfectionist ethics – an act is right insofar as it perfects an individuals’
spiritual nature; a vitalistic-utilitarian principle – an act is right insofar as it
maximises the vital load of the society; and, lastly, a deontological principle
of vitality — an act is right insofar as it honours a person’s spiritual energy.
This view also plausibly explains why it is wrong to torture a cat or chim-
panzee for fun; by so doing, one would be failing to honour the vitality of the
entity in question, since it possesses some. 
Conclusion
I argued that humanism is not a plausible interpretation of the African moral
tradition since it does not cohere with some dominant conception of African
metaphysics, which is plainly religious. I demonstrated the implausibility of
humanistic ethical theories through their failure to capture one vital aspect of
African metaphysics, specifically the fact that some non-human components
matter for their own sakes. Or, I argued to the effect that it is implausible to
interpret the African moral theories to be anthropocentric, as do Gyekye,
Wiredu and Metz, since this fails to cohere with the holistic picture of African
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metaphysics I described. I also suggested a preferable theory of morality (the
good) that best coheres with an all-inclusive African metaphysics, which is as
much spiritual as it is material. The literature as it stands has not yet provided
a systematic and rational account of ethical supernaturalism or even non-nat-
uralism. I closed by motivating for a vitality based meta-ethics, that is a view
that promises to give an interesting meta-ethical and normative theories,
which, on the face of it, appear well poised to explain what is wrong with tor-
turing animals for fun – one would not be respecting the vitality of the animal
in question.  
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Notes
1.    I use the notion of ‘humanism’ to distinguish a meta-ethical position that is neither super-
naturalist nor non-naturalist but one that grounds the source of morality on some fact(s)
about human beings. As such, to refer to an African ethics as humanistic is tantamount to
referring to it as secular, and to claim that the relevant secular moral property is to be found
on some human property, or so I interpret those who defend this view.
2.    The following influential African philosophers defend humanism: Kwasi Wiredu (1992:
194); Kwame Gyekye (1995: 143); Thad Metz (2011: 390). The following are not so influ-
ential but also advocate humanism: Dzobo (1992: 224). 
3.    Gyekye (1995: 129–43) and Wiredu (1992: 194–6) offer arguments in which they attempt
to demonstrate that ethical supernaturalism is implausible. Metz, on his part, does not give
an argument that rejects supernaturalism but endorses the interpretation by Gyekye and
Wiredu (Metz 2007: 328) and he also offers considerations that motivate for a secular
approach to ethics (Metz 2010: 81–2).
4.    Metz (2007: 321) rejects ethical supernaturalism and further observes that if his ethical
account is true, it will be enough to reject some, if not all, kinds of non-naturalism. I also
inform the reader, so far as I am aware of the literature in African ethics, there is no system-
atic account that directly advocates and defends an African version of non-naturalism. 
5.    Space does not permit me to give both an argument against humanism and one defending
ethical supernaturalism. I do have an unpublished article wherein I defend one version of
ethical supernaturalism, which I can avail on request.  
6.    It is important to note that in the African tradition the is/ought distinction is not taken seri-
ously; in fact, my familiarity with the literature treats it as no problem at all. For example,
Menkiti talking about the biological fact that each person has their own body observes:
‘That sort of given fact is a brute biological fact. But it need not be read as conveying a
message that each stands alone. Normative standing is one thing, and superficial biological
considerations quite another. I use the word “superficial” advisedly because, on a deeper
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level, both norm and biology do tend to converge’ (2004: 324). The idea is that factual
claims at a deeper level have a tendency to converge with moral claims. Gyekye also
observes that ‘Moral questions … may … be said to be linked to, or engendered by, meta-
physical conceptions of the person’ (1997: 36). This view I think can best be understood
when we stop insisting on treating African traditional morality within the dominant episte-
mological canons of Western modern morality, which accepts the is/ought gap. African
ethics can best be understood, I insist, within a thought system wherein ‘the ontological
relationship and significance of existence of being as such within the cosmic world of other
beings that are in turn closely morally related. Hence, being or existence in general and
morality are closely intertwined among … most African communities’ (Chemhuru 2013:
74). Alasdair MacIntyre’s observation that ‘it is only in the seventeenth century, when this
distinguishing of the moral from the theological, the legal and the aesthetic has become a
received doctrine that the project of an independent rational justification of morality
becomes not merely the concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European
culture’ (1981: 39). The African moral tradition insists on rejecting this distinguishing of
the moral and metaphysical (Imafidon 2013: 48, 49). The separation of these categories
makes sense if one removes God as premise, an approach I reject. I leave a thorough
enquiry into this issue for another project to justify why Africans should not take seriously
the is/ought gap. In that project, I will give a thorough response to Metz (2013: 189–204).  
7.    My comments and analysis only involve analysis of humanism as is dominant in African
philosophy, they may apply to other related forms of humanism in other traditions that
share similar features to the humanism rejected here. 
8.    Kwasi Wiredu can truly be described as an elder of African philosophy, boasting more
than forty years as a professional philosopher. He is a Professor Emeritus at the University
of South Florida; he has held a number of visiting professorships internationally; he has
served on a number of distinguished committees and his publications record speaks vol-
umes about the quality of his work. It is for this reason that I decided to explore the ethical
work of this seasoned African philosopher, who has been exploring various issues in the
African tradition. 
9.    Kwame Gyekye, in his own right, is an elder of African philosophy. He is a professor of
philosophy at the University of Ghana. He has published books and articles in the area of
African philosophy. He is famous for his intense debate with a Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi
Menkiti with whom he graduated from Harvard. I picked his account because his ethical
and political view of ‘moderate communitarianism’ has had a great influence on African
moral and political philosophy for the past twenty years or so. 
10.    Thaddeus Metz is an American scholar who has relocated to South Africa, a Distinguished
Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg. Metz’s philosophical
contribution to African philosophy or ubuntu is impressive both in quality and quantity; it
is thus not surprising that he has been granted an A-rating research status by the National
Research Funding (South Africa). I included him in this list firstly because of the quality of
work he has done in the field of African ethics. In the space of about seven years or so, he
has developed an ethical system that is influenced, among others, by Desmond Tutu, famous
for chairing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and turned it into a
philosophically robust view that has interesting implications for bioethics, environmental
ethics and political philosophy.
11.    I here only reference Menkiti’s (2004) piece since it is a more systematic and accurate
expression of his position with regards to the personhood debate than the initial statement. 
12.    The is/ought distinction is generally ignored in the African tradition or does not appear to
be considered to be a problem, as I noted earlier. Furthermore, I hope the reader has noted
that I, unlike Gyekye, used the phrase ‘moral value’ rather than ‘moral standing’ since the
latter is typically used in bioethical context to refer to moral status. 
13.    Gyekye on his part argues that his ethic is only based on one fundamental fact of welfare. I
argue (along with Metz) that if one takes into consideration Gyekye’s moderate communi-
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tarian view, his ethics is best construed as dualistic: dignity and welfare (common good) as
basic moral facts (Metz 2012: 61, 62). My argument for this interpretation of Gyekye is in
my Ph.D. dissertation, which is currently being marked.  
14.    This is the view that informs much of environmental ethics: non-human components matter
for their own sake (Brennan 2011).
15.    Gyekye (2010), more accurately, does not rule out completely the supernatural aspects in
the domain of morality but merely assigns it the role of reinforcing it rather than grounding
it. My problem with this account is that it trivialises the role of the supernatural in morality. 
16.    I am not familiar with an African conception of what constitutes individual or even political
freedom. Even the one article I am familiar with does not appeal to the common liberal
stock of civil liberties or even the notion of autonomy (Siame 2005: 53–67).
17.    More accurately, I understand Metz to be arguing for some kind of ‘weak anthropocen-
trism’, a claim that non-human components have moral status but it is less than that of
human beings (Behrens 2011: 39; Metz 2011: 389). But, I think all interpretations of
anthropocentrism fail correctly to capture an African ethics.
18.    This is a meta-ethical value that claims that rightness is a function of a ‘say so’ of a subject
or individual. Morality is here determined by the subject.
19.    This is a meta-ethical view that claims that morality is a function of a ‘say so’ of a culture.
Morality here is determined by a culture.
20.    In my Ph.D. I defend this particular view, wherein I argue that human beings have a capacity
for transcendental care, which serves as a ground-norm against which to distinguish right
from wrong actions, a conception of moral status, human dignity and rights. 
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